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THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IMPERILED: THE
NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 413-415 AND THE
USE OF OTHER SEXUAL-OFFENSE EVIDENCE IN
WASHINGTON
Jeffrey G. Pickett
Abstract: The U.S. Congress has provisionally enacted three new federal rules of evidence
(FRE). In cases of sexual assault or child molestation, FRE 413-415 allow the use, for any
relevant purpose, of sexual assault or child molestation evidence not charged in the indictment
or information. The new rules would operate in contravention of the traditional prohibition
against using evidence of other misconduct for the purpose of proving that the defendant
acted in conformity with a particular character trait on the occasion in question. This
Comment surveys the arguments for and against the proposed changes. It concludes that
Washington should not elect to follow this latest addition to the Federal Rules of Evidence on
grounds that the new rules are too broad to fairly govern the use of such potentially
prejudicial evidence. The Comment discusses less drastic changes which would improve the
way in which other sexual misconduct evidence is used in Washington state courts.
On September 13, 1994, the U.S. Congress passed the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.' Appended to this omnibus
legislation were three provisory Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE).2 Rule
413 will allow the government to introduce evidence of the commission
of a prior sexual assault for "its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant" in a case where the defendant is charged with sexual assault.3
Rule 414 allows the same use of evidence of prior child molestation in
cases where the defendant is charged with child molestation.' FRE 415
extends this treatment of prior-sexual-offense evidence to civil cases.'
1. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat 1796, 2135-37 (1994).
2. Fed. R. Evid. 413-415. The new rules are subject to a period of review by the Judicial
Conference of the United States. The Conference has solicited comments from a broad spectrum of
the legal community and will recommend changes. Congress is under no obligation to adopt the
Conference's recommendations, however. The new rules will take effect before August 1995 either
as currently enacted or as subsequently modified by Congress. See infra notes 105-107 and
accompanying text.
3. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2136 (1994).
4. Id. at 2136-37.
5. Id. at 2137. Unless defined otherwise, the term "sexual offense" is used in this Comment to
refer to the conduct encompassed under both Rule 413 (sexual assault) and Rule 414 (child
molestation). Additionally, the Comment uses the words "prior-sexual-offense evidence"
interchangeably with the words "uncharged-sexual-offense evidence." Both refer to evidence of
crimes that are not charged in the indictment of the defendant, including crimes committed either
before or after the act which led to the indictment. See State v. Laureano, 101 Wash. 2d 745, 764,
682 P.2d 889, 901 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wash. 2d 124, 761
P.2d 588 (1988), superseded on reh'g by State v. Brown, 113 Wash. 2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013 (1989).
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Lest there exist any doubt over the scope of this revolution in the law of
evidence, the congressional sponsors of the legislation made it clear that
relevant uses of prior-sexual-offense evidence include proving that a
defendant acted in conformity with his or her character.6
These additions to Article IV of the FRE7 change two hundred years
of evidentiary jurisprudence.8 The congressional sponsors of the new
rules argue that the changes are needed to successfully prosecute sexual-
assault and child-molestation crimes.9 Nevertheless, FRE 413-415 have
encountered widespread attacks from within the legal community. When
the Judicial Conference of the United States ° solicited comments from
scholars, attorneys, and judges across the country, the vast majority of
the responses it received criticized the new rules.1
Part I of this Comment describes the evidentiary landscape into which
the new rules are offered and outlines the current law in Washington with
regard to evidence of uncharged sexual offenses. Part II sets forth the
language of FRE 413-415, discusses possible interpretations of their
provisions, and describes the hopes that the sponsors of the legislation
have attached to the rules' enactment. Part II then briefly reviews the
new rules' procedural disposition and reports a draft of an alternative
formulation of the rules offered by the Judicial Conference of the United
States.' 2 Part III asserts that FRE 413-415 are based on unsupported
views about the source and nature of sexual-offense behavior and that the
rules undermine the presumption of innocence traditionally accorded
6. See 140 Cong. Rec. H8968-01, H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
Rules of evidence historically have prohibited such use of uncharged-misconduct evidence. See infra
notes 15-20 and accompanying text. This Comment uses the phrase "character evidence"
interchangeably with "propensity evidence.'
7. Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence and governs the
conditions under which such evidence is admissible at trial. See 1 Michael H. Graham, Modern State
and Federal Evidence: A Comprehensive Reference Text 9-10 (1989).
8. See Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidence in
Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 713, 713 (1981) [hereinafter Reed, Propensity-Part 1].
9. See infra notes 92-93.
10. The Judicial Conference of the United States was created pursuant ta 28 U.S.C. § 331 and
advises the United States Supreme Court on Court-prescribed rules of practice and procedure. 28
U.S.C. § 331 (1995).
11. Letter from Dean Margaret A. Berger, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, to John K.
Rabiej, Chief, Rules Committee Support Office, Administrative Office of the United States Courts
(Nov. 17, 1994) [hereinafter Berger] (on file with the Washington Law Review) (declaring in
enclosed materials entitled "Suggested Language for Transmittal Statement for Rule 404 (Broun
draft #2)" that the "overwhelming majority" of respondents believed the rules were unwarranted).
12. The Judicial Conferences Advisory Committee on Evidence prepar.ed the alternative rules
after reviewing the written reactions of lawyers, judges, and legal scholar; to the new rules. See
Berger, supra note 11.
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criminal defendants in the U.S. judicial system. Finally, part IV presents
three possible responses that the state of Washington, either through its
legislature or through its supreme court, might make in view of the new
rules. 3 First, the legislature and/or the state supreme court could reject
suggestions that Washington follow the new federal rules and retain the
status quo. Second, the supreme court could broaden the current "lustful
disposition" rule14 to encompass evidence of offenses against victims in
the same class as the victim of the charged crime. Lastly, the legislature
or supreme court could limit the use of propensity evidence to those
cases where a medical or psychological assessment has determined that a
defendant suffers from a psychologically- or biologically-sourced
compulsion to commit sexual offenses.
I. THE LANDSCAPE INTO WHICH FRE 413-415 ARE OFFERED
A. The Tradition of Excluding Propensity Evidence
A prohibition against using prior-misconduct evidence has existed in
some form in Anglo-American jurisprudence for almost three hundred
years.'5 Numerous American state courts had adopted their English
forebears' restrictions on prior-criminal-acts evidence by the end of the
eighteenth century. 6 Though the adoption of the Federal Rules of
13. Although not obligated to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Washington Rules of
Evidence (ER) are modeled after and strongly influenced by them. See Lewis H. Orland, Chairman's
Introduction to the Washington Rules of Evidence (1978), reprinted in Karl B. Tegland, 5
Washington Practice: Evidence Law and Practice viii (3d ed. 1989). See also State v. Brown, 111
Wash. 2d 124, 151, 761 P.2d 588, 603 (1988). The Washington Supreme Court adopted the
Washington Rules of Evidence as rules of court in April 1979. See Orland, supra, at viii; Tegland,
supra, § 1. It may amend the rules under a statutory grant of authority or under an assertion of
inherent power to oversee the judicial process. See Wash. Rev. Code § 2.04.190 (1994) (conferring
power on the state supreme court to prescribe rules governing the practice and procedure used in
state courts); State v. Fitzsimmons, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 858, 620 P.2d 999, 1000 (1980) (stating that
the state supreme court possesses inherent rule making powers). The Washington Legislature also
may amend the state's evidence rules. "The legislature may prescribe rules of procedure and
evidence... "' Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp.,.112 Wash. 2d 636, 657, 771 P.2d 711, 722 (1989)
(citation omitted). Thus, it can be expected that concerned citizens will ask either the legislature or
the supreme court for a hearing on the merits of following the new federal rules.
14. Washington's current lustful-disposition exception allows the use of uncharged-misconduct
evidence to prove criminal propensity when the victim of the charged and uncharged incidents is the
same person. See State v. Ray, 116 Wash. 2d 531, 547, 806 P.2d 1220, 1229-30 (1991).
15. See Reed, Propensity - Part I, supra note 8, at 716-18. The types of prohibited uses have
varied over time; however, a prohibition of some kind has existed since the end of the 17th century.
Id.
16. Id. at 720-21.
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Evidence in 197517 greatly expanded the approved uses of prior-
misconduct evidence, use of such evidence solely fo:r the purpose of
showing criminal propensity remained forbidden. 8 All federal circuits
recognize this basic maxim under the FRE, 9 and all stae jurisdictions at
least formally recognize a similar maxim under their own rules of
evidence as well.20
The prohibition against using uncharged-misconduct evidence to
prove propensity exists because much uncharged-misconduct evidence is
only weakly relevant to the issue of a defendant's action at a later date.1
Psychological research indicates that disposition, or character, is a very
poor predictor of conduct on a specific occasion.' To the extent that the
prior-act evidence is at all relevant, its probative value often is
marginal.' For example, a woman whose past acts show her to be violent
is violent only during a tiny percentage of her life.24 Mcst of the minutes
in her life are lived peaceably. Furthermore, her violence is much more
likely to be triggered by situational variables than by a consistent
17. Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence as Pub. L. No. 93-595; 88 Stat. 1926, on
January 2, 1975; the rules became effective July 1, 1975. See 2 Graham, supra note 7, at 883, 1047
(1989).
18. See Report to the Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice, The
Admission of Criminal Histories at Trial, 22 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 707, 719 (1989). Authorities often
use the term "propensity" interchangeably with "character." Character evidrnce refers to evidence
showing a person's general disposition, or to a disposition for a specific trait. McCormick on
Evidence § 195 (Edward W. Cleary gen. ed., 3d ed. 1984).
19. See Thomas J. Reed, Admission of Other CriminalAct Evidence After Adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 53 U. Cin. L. Rev. 113, 162 (1984).
20. Thirty-eight states model their rules of evidence on the FRE. See le'ter from Paul R. Rice,
Professor of Law, The American University, (containing unpublished manuscript entitled
Memorandum of Law), to the Secretary of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 17
(Oct. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Rice] (on file with the Washington Law Review). The Memorandum of
Law was prepared by Professor Rice and members of his Advanced Evidence seminar. The other
state jurisdictions follow a state code or decisional law that expresses the maxim. See Thomas J.
Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender
Cases, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 127, 159 n.179 (1993) [hereinafter Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited] (stating
that all states have a common law or statutory version of the rule set forth in People v. Molineux, 61
N.E. 286 (1901)). The court in Molineux held that evidence of prior poisoning was not admissible to
prove the defendant's disposition to commit the charged crime of murder-by-poisoning, but could be
used, if not unfairly prejudicial, to show motive, intent, lack of accident or mistake, common
scheme, or identity. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 293-303.
21. See Edward J. Irawinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 2:18 (1994).
22. See Miguel Angel Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code
Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1003, 1052
(1984).
23. See Robert H. Aronson, The Law of Evidence in Washington 404-05 to 404-06 (2d ed. 1993).
24. Id. at 404-06.
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character trait.O Thus, her past violence, in and of itself, does not offer a
significant amount of help in determining what she did at a later time.
Nevertheless, the jury is likely to be mesmerized by the uncharged
misconduct and accord too much weight to its probative value.26
The use of character evidence to prove conduct is potentially highly
prejudicial in another manner as well." The jury may be tempted by
evidence of prior misconduct to punish a defendant for who he or she is
rather than for what he or she has done. Research has demonstrated that
admission of a defendant's prior bad acts significantly increases the
chances that a jury will find liability or guilt.2" One well-known study
conducted at the University of Chicago Law School concluded that the
introduction of such evidence threatens the presumption of innocence
usually accorded the accused in a criminal trial.29 Federal and state courts
have echoed this fear."
Finally, the authorities also cite jury confusion and wasted time as
further problems with allowing prior bad acts to prove character." They
predict burdensome mini-trials on the history and importance of each
prior act offered during a proceeding.32
B. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
Nevertheless, courts and scholars have felt that prior-act evidence is
useful and not overly prejudicial when offered to prove something other
than the character of the accused.33 In federal jurisdictions, such use is
regulated primarily under FR.E 404.34 Rule 404 has two subsections.
25. See Mendez, supra note 22, at 1052 (discussing studies showing that behavior is dependent on
highly specific stimulus situations and discounting the widely-held view that people behave
consistently with character traits).
26. See Inwinkelried, supra note 21, § 2:18.
27. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,475-76 (1948).
28. See, eg., Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 160-61, 178-79 (1966).
29. See id. at 179; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 21, § 1.02 nn.-12 and accompanying text.
30. See McCormick on Evidence, supra note 18, § 190 n.1 (collecting cases).
31. Id § 190.
32. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Prior Similar Acts in Prosecutions for Rape and Child Sex Abuse, 4
Crim. L.F. 307,316 (1993).
33. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 18, § 190.
34. Cf 1 Graham, supra note 7, at 512-19 (discussing, both generally and in the context of the
federal rules, the regulation of the use of character evidence). Provisions of several other rules also
govern the admission of other misconduct evidence. Where character is not an essential element of
the charge, Rule 405 restricts the admission of character evidence to reputation or opinion testimony.
Rule 406 allows a proponent to prove the occurrence of a crime by introducing other act evidence
showing the behavior in question to be habitual. Rule 412 prohibits the use of a victim's unrelated
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Subsection (a) generally prohibits the use of character evidence to prove
action in conformity therewith except when offered to prove or rebut a
defendant's assertion of a positive character trait or to prove or rebut a
pertinent victim or witness character trait." Subsection (b) specifically
prohibits the use of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts (bad-acts evidence) to
show the defendant acted in conformance with a criminal character.36
Exceptions outlined in 404(b) allow use of relevant bad-acts evidence for
other purposes, including showing motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.37
The list of proper uses for bad-acts evidence cited in Rule 404(b) is
not necessarily exclusive.38 Most federal jurisdictions read the words
"such as,"39 which introduce the list, to indicate that the several named
purposes which follow are examples and that the list is capable of
expansion.4' Thus, FRE 404(b) is an inclusionary rle,4t forbidding
evidence of other crimes only when it is offered to prove that the
defendant was predisposed by his or her character to commit the charged
crime. 4
2
C. The "Lustful Disposition" Rule
Many state jurisdictions, including those following the federal rules
and those following their own codes or common law rules, employ a
non-enumerated exception to the prohibition against use of bad-acts
prior sexual activity to support defendant's claim of mistaken identity or victim consent to the
charged act. Rules 608 and 609 govern the use of character evidence to impeach witnesses. See Fed.
R. Evid. 405, 406, 412, 608, and 609. Finally, Rules 401,402, and 403 contol the admission of all
evidence, including evidence admitted under Rule 404. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, and 403 advisory
committee notes.
35. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a).
36. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
37. Id. Identity is provable with prior bad acts by showing a defendar.t's "modus operandi."
Modus operandi is a term used to describe the situation where a unique method or set of
circumstances surrounds an act and therefore serves to identify a defen&mt as the person who
committed a nearly identical act. See Aronson, supra note 23, at 404-18.
38. See United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731,737 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 970 (1981).
39. Rule 404(b) states that bad-acts evidence, while not admissible to shcw propensity, may "be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive ..."
40. See Imwinkelried, supra note 21, § 2:30 (1994 & Supp. 1994) (indiemting that all but one of
the federal circuits clearly adhere to this view).
41. See id. The alternative, minority view of Rule 404(b) is that it is an "exclusionary" rule. Under
this interpretation, the general rule is that uncharged-misconduct evidence is inadmissible, except in
the specifically enumerated exceptions of Rul: 404(b). See id.
42. Diggs, 649 F.2d at 737.
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evidence in sexual-offense cases.43 Washington is among these
jurisdictions and categorizes the exception under the term "lustful
disposition." The exception allows admission of evidence showing a
passion for unusual or abnormal sexual gratification.45 The category has
at least three variations: the narrow, the broad, and the very broad.
The narrow exception restricts use of prior-sexual-misconduct
evidence to cases where the victim of both the uncharged and the
charged crimes is the same person.' Courts reason that the evidence of
the uncharged crime shows a lustful disposition on the part of the
defendant toward a particular victim47 and thus, is probative of the
defendant's charged actions toward the victim.
48
Under the broad exception, evidence of prior sexual offenses against
persons related to the victim of the charged crime may be used to prove
the defendant's propensity for similar conduct.49 In an incest case, for
example, courts reason that the evidence of a prior offense committed
against the victim's sibling is relevant to show the defendant's incestuous
inclination toward family members.5 °
When the victims of a single defendant do not share enough in
common to be comfortably classified into a group, the very broad
exception may be called forth. Under this version of the lustful-
disposition rule, courts focus on the defendant's general sexual deviance
or aggressiveness and not on the triggers for that deviance or
43. See Beale, supra note 32, at 312-13. See also Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited, supra note 20, at
188 n.340 (citing cases arising in jurisdictions that employ a lustful disposition type of exception).
44. See, eg., State v. Ray, 116 Wash. 2d 531, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991) (holding that evidence of
defendant's earlier incestuous assaults against his daughter was properly admitted in later incest case
involving the same daughter to show a lustful disposition toward the victim).
45. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 18, § 190. For a more complete discussion of the
development of the sexual-offense evidence exceptions, including an explanation of the differing
treatment "deviant" sexual offenses (homosexual acts, incest, child molestation, sodomy) at one time
received from "non-deviant" sexual offenses (heterosexual rape, adultery), see Imwinkelried, supra
note 21, § 4:11-4:18.
46. See, e.g., State v. Carver, 37 Wash. App. 122, 126, 678 P.2d 842, 844 (1984) ("An exception
of long standing extends to collateral sexual misconduct of a defendant which establishes a lustful
disposition toward the offended female.') (citations omitted).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, eg., Soper v. State, 731 P.2d 587, 590-91 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (holding defendant's
sexual assaults on the sisters of the victim of the charged crime admissible to show a propensity to
sexually assault his daughters).
50. Id.
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aggressiveness." Uncharged-sexual-offense evidence will be admissible
to prove that the defendant suffers from a general compulsion for sexual
deviance, even where the charged crime is quite different from the prior
misconduct. 2 This version of the lustful-disposition rale is similar in
spirit to FRE 413-415."3
Not all courts recognize a specific lustful-dispos-ition exception. 4
Nevertheless, observers of Rule 404(b) have concluded that many courts
will more readily find that evidence of prior, similar acts satisfies one of
the enumerated exceptions in seual-offense cases than in other criminal
cases.5 Virtually nowhere in the United States, therefore, is the use of
prior-sexual-offense evidence comprehensively banned. The supporters
of the new rules are concerned, nevertheless, that this kI-d of evidence is
not always presumed to be admissible in prosecutions for sexual
offenses.5 6
D. The Current Law in Washington with Regard to Prior-Sexual-
Offense Evidence
Evidence of prior sexual offenses is admissible under numerous
circumstances in Washington. Courts admit the uncharged-misconduct
evidence if it satisfies one of the enumerated exceptions in Washington
Rule of Evidence 404(b).' In addition, Washington recognizes a "lustful
51. See, e.g., Burris v. State, 420 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. Ct App. 1992) (allowing use of evidence of
defendant's ownership of pornography and sex toys to prove "bent of mind" in a child-molestation
case).
52. Id.
53. Both allow evidence of prior sexual misconduct to be used in any subsequent case where the
charge may be unrelated by victim or specific act to the proffered evidence but still falls within the
broad category of sexual offense. Compare FRE 413-414 with Burris, 420 S.E.2d 582.
54. See Imwinkelried, supra note 21, § 4:18 (1994 & Supp. 1994).
55. See Beale, supra note 32, at 309.
56. See 140 Cong. Rec. S12990-01, S12990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(stating that the strength of the new rules lies in the presumption they establish that such evidence is
"typically relevant and probative, and that its probative value is not outweighed by any risk of
prejudice").
57. See Aronson, supra note 23, at 404-13 to 404-19 (describing the criteria governing
introduction of evidence under the motive, premeditation, intent, absence of accident or mistake,
common plan or scheme, and identity (modus operandi) exceptions).
The doctrine of chances, which figures prominently in the reasoning used by the proponents of the
new rules, offers a different basis of admissibility. Proponents of the doctrine assert that an innocent
person is unlikely to be associated with evidence of repeated criminal behavior. As more incidents
accumulate implicating the person, the prior-offense evidence becomes probative of whether the
person committed the charged offense. The doctrine does not appear to be recognized in Washington
as a separate basis of admissibility. See Tegland, supra note 13, § 120, at 428-29. Instead, the
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disposition" exception58 but limits its use to showing a lascivious
predilection for the victim.59
To appreciate the scope of the change Rules 413-415 would trigger
should they be followed in Washington, it will be helpful to trace an
offer of uncharged-sexual-offense evidence through a Washington
court's decision-making calculus under the current rules. Professor
Robert Aronsone° has provided an example of the kind of analysis that
Washington courts must undergo when faced with uncharged-sexual-
offense evidence.6 In State v. Bowen,62 the Washington Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's conviction of a physician for indecent liberties.
Two of the defendant's former patients testified that the defendant had
similarly molested them. The court of appeals went through the possible
exceptions under which the testimony might have been admitted
properly.63 It rejected the idea that the prior acts showed the defendant's
motive, finding nothing about the earlier acts that might have driven the
defendant to molest the third victim.' The court also could not discern
an overarching scheme or plan, even though the testimony described a
similar sequence of events leading up to the offense.65 The court next
rejected use of the evidence to prove modus operandi because the
perpetrator's identity was not in issue.66 Neither could the evidence be
used to show absence of mistake, because the defendant had not claimed
accidental touching.67 Finally, the evidence was not admissible to prove
the mens rea element, because it already was established from the
probability theory that the doctrine utilizes is admissible only to show absence of mistake or
accident, or to prove intent. Id. See also State v. Bowen, 48 Wash. App. 187, 738 P.2d 316 (1987).
58. See Tegland, supra note 13, § 120, at 424-26 & nn.1-10 (collecting cases).
59. See, e.g., State v. Bernson, 40 Wash. App. 729, 737-38, 700 P.2d 758, 765 (1985) (stating
that "[e]vidence showing lustful disposition should only be admitted in a sex offense case where it
tends to show such lustful inclination toward the offended female") (quoting State v. Whalon,
I Wash. App. 785, 794,464 P.2d 730, 737 (1970)); see also Tegland, supra note 13, § 120, at 424-
25 nn.1-6 (collecting cases containing the rule in rape, statutory rape, incest, seduction, sodomy, and
indecent-liberties cases). But see State v. Sammons, 47 Wash. App. 762, 737 P.2d 684 (1987)
(holding that in a prosecution for indecent liberties, the statement of defendant that he had sexually
molested other children seven years earlier was admissible as an admission by a party under ER
801(d)(2); ER 404(b) did not control, and the evidence was relevant on general principles).
60. Professor of Law, University ofWashington School of Law.
61. See Aronson, supra note 23, at 404-21.
62. 48 Wash. App. 187, 738 P.2d 316 (1987).
63. Id. at 190-95, 738 P.2d at 319-21.
64. Id. at 191-92, 738 P.2d at 319-20.
65. Id. at 192, 738 P.2d at 320.
66. Id. at 192-93, 738 P.2d at 320-21.
67. Id. at 193-94,738 P.2d at 321.
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defendant's own testimony that he intended to touch the victim.6" The
court concluded that the only purpose for which the prior-offense
evidence could be used was to show that the defendant was possessed of
a character, or propensity, to behave in this manner. Such purpose, the
court ruled, was prohibited under ER 404(b). 69
The new federal rules would precipitate a profound change in
Washington criminal prosecutions for sexual offenses. The new rules'
broad grant of admissibility of other sex-offense evidence in these cases
would obviate the need for courts to go through the careful analysis of
Bowen. Instead, a presumption of admissibility would exist, and prior-
sexual-offense evidence could be used for any relevent purpose. FIE
413-415 do not reflect concerns that Washington state courts
traditionally have shown regarding the prejudice of such evidence to
defendants.70
I. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 413,414, AND 415: THEIR
LANGUAGE, MEANING, PROMISE, AND PROCEDURAL
DISPOSITION
A. The Language of FRE 413-415 and What the New Rules Mean
The most crucial section in each of the three new rules is the first.
FRE 413(a) provides: "(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is
accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's
commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is
admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which
it is relevant."' Rule 414 mimics the structure and language of Rule 413
but extends 413's principle of general admissibility to evidence of past
acts of child molestation in cases where the charge is child molestation.72
FRE 415 also mimics the language and structure of Rule 413, making
evidence of prior sexual offenses admissible in civil cases that arise out
of allegations of sexual assault or child molestation.7'
68. Id. at 194-95, 738 P.2d at 321.
69. Id. at 195-96, 738 P.2d at 321-22.
70. See, e.g., State v. Saltarelli, 98 Wash. 2d 358, 655 P.2d 697 (1982).
71. 108 Stat 1796, 2136 (1994). Subsection (d) defines sexual assault to include rape and other
sexual contact prohibited under state and federal law. Subsection (b) requihes that the defendant be
notified at least 15 days before trial that the government intends to use prior-sexual-assault evidence.
72. 108 Stat. 1796,2136-2137 (1994).
73. 108 Stat. 1796, 2137 (1994). Though Rule 415 may prove especially significant as more
victims utilize civil actions to attempt to repair the damage caused by their attackers, the significance
Vol. 70:883, 1995
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The quoted language has provoked conflicting speculation over a
variety of implications. Lawyers, judges, and scholars responding to the
Judicial Conference's solicitation of comments have voiced concern that
the new rules are ambiguous.74 Predominant among the questions is how
FRE 413-415 fit within Article IV's existing framework.75
Article IV regulates the introduction of evidence into judicial
proceedings by defining relevant evidence and setting forth the
conditions under which relevant evidence may be admitted or excluded.76
The new rules implicitly make themselves subject to FRE 401 and 402"7
by stating that evidence of prior sexual offenses may be used for "its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant."78 But by stating without
qualification that such evidence "is admissible" for such uses,79 the rules
have raised doubt as to whether they come within FRE 403's familiar
balancing requirement."
of the new rules is greatest when a defendant's freedom is at stake. Thus, the focus of this Comment
is on the ramifications for criminal defendants.
74. See, e.g., letter from Bernard Meltzer, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor
Emeritus of Law, University of Chicago Law School, to the Judicial Conference's Secretary of the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1 (Oct. 11, 1994) [hereinafter Meltzer] (on file with
the Washington Law Review) (wondering "whether [the new rules] are subject to Rule 403"); letter
from David P. Leonard, Chair, Section on Evidence, Association of American Law Schools, and 19
other professors of law, to the Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 1, 3
(Oct. 12, 1994) (on file with the Washington Law Review) (stating that the new rules "contain
numerous inconsistencies and ambiguities" and therefore are likely to "cause considerable confusion
to both courts and litigants").
75. The most widely discussed implication of the new rules' language in letters to the Judicial
Conference has been whether FRE 413-415 are subject to a judicially administered balancing test.
See generally, Meltzer, supra note 74.
76. See Fed. R. Evid. 401-412.
77. FRE 402 states that all relevant evidence is admissible, unless limited by constitutional
requirements, statute, or any other rules applicable in federal court; FRE 401 defines relevant
evidence as that which has "any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence:' Fed. R. Evid. 401-402.
78. 108 Stat. 1796, 2136-2137.
79. Id.
80. FRE 403 states that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Fed.
R. Evid. 403. The doubt exists among critics and supporters alike. See Meltzer, supra note 74, at 2
(observing that Congress failed to expressly make the new rules subject to FRE 403's balancing
test); see also letter from Lynn McLain, Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law,
to the Judicial Conference's Secretary of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 (Sept.
28, 1994) (on file with the Washington Law Review) (supporting the new rules and assuming that
their language is "intended to preclude the trial court's use of Rule 403 to exclude evidence-for
fear... that unsympathetic judges easily could use 403 to circumvent the policy determination made
by Congress").
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Commentators generally advance two interpre-tations of the
relationship between the new rules and Rule 403. The: first reads FRE
413-415 as falling outside of Rule 403's dominion. It is based on a
literal reading of the rules and on the placement of the rules in a new
section at the end of Article IV." The second understands the new rules
to be subject to Rule 403's balancing test. This view points to explicit
statements in the legislative history indicating Congress's intention that
Rule 403 govern admissibility. 2
The literalist interpretation assumes that Congress already has made
the probative-value-versus-prejudicial-effect calculation for the courts in
favor of always finding probative value. 3 Subscribers to this view direct
attention to the "mandatory cast" of the new rules.' The rules state that
the uncharged-misconduct evidence "is" admissible, suggesting that this
is so regardless of the outcome of a Rule 403 analysis. Furthermore, the
new rules make no mention of their relationship to Rule 403, and no
official comment was included by Congress offering guidance for how
the courts should address questions of prejudicial effect.8 5 Thus,
according to this reading, admissibility of evidence under the new rules
is not conditioned on meeting the requirements of Rule 403.
The opposing view finds support in the Congressional Record itself.
The sponsors of the rules believed that the new rules would be subject to
some form of judicial balancing test.86 The statements of the key
81. See Meltzer, supra note 74.
82. See 140 Cong. Rec. S12990-01 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
83. Cf. 137 Cong. Rec. S3238, S3240 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (statement of Sen. Thurmond
introducing section 801 analysis) ("In general, the probative value of such evidence is strong, and is
not outweighed by any overriding risk of prejudice."). The quoted language comes from a detailed,
section-by-section analysis of, and argument for, substantially identical rules of evidence. These
rules were submitted by President George Bush to Congress in 1991 and cromposed section 801 of
Senate Bill 635. The rules were not passed into law. However, the section 801 analysis has been
incorporated into the legislative history of the 1994 Crime Bill for the purpose of explaining the new
rules' history, precedential support, and proper interpretation. See 140 Cong. Rec. S12990-01 (daily
ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
84. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 74, at 1-2 (stating that the language of the rules "appears to
mandate admissibility for 'relevant' evidence without regard to the balancing prescribed by Rule
403" and that "[tihe mandatory cast of this language is ... reinforced by its. sharp contrast with the
language of other Rules").
85. The advisory committee note that follows FRE 403 states that "[t]he rules which follow in this
Article are concrete applications evolved for particular situations." Fed. R. Evid. 403. Because the
new rules obviously were not contemplated when the note to Rule 403 was written, it is at least
arguable that the note would not apply to M 413-415.
86. See, e.g., 140 Cong. Rec. S12990-01 (Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole) (stating that
courts will retain their "authority under evidence rule 403 to exclude evidence whose probative value
is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect"); 140 Cong. Rec. H89658-01, H8991-92 (daily
ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) (using the same language as Senator Dole).
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sponsors made just before passage clearly present the view that Rule
403's balancing test applies to the new rules.87
B. The Logic of the Sponsors' Arguments and the Goals They Hope to
Achieve Through Enactment of FRE 413-415
The new rules received wide support in Congress" and carry with
their enactment significant hopes. The rules' sponsors were concerned
primarily with public safety. 9 The arguments made in support of the new
rules can be divided into three general categories, all related to protecting
the public: (1) the need to win convictions in difficult-to-prosecute sex-
offense cases; (2) the probative value of sexual-offense evidence; and (3)
the need for consistency in judicial decision-making with regard to
uncharged-sexual-offense evidence.
The first category relies upon descriptions of the crimes involved.
Supporters of the rules view sexual offenses as egregious attacks on
vulnerable individuals. Aggressive, successful prosecutions thus are
especially warranted.91 The sponsors also describe sexual-offense crimes
87. Id.
88. See 129 Cong. Rec. S15137-38 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1993) (75-19 vote in favor of adopting
amendment adding FRE 413-415 to crime bill); 140 Cong. Rec. H5437, H5440-41 (daily ed., June
29, 1994) (348-62 vote in favor of adopting motion instructing conferees to include FRE 413-415 in
crime bill).
89. See 137 Cong. Rec. S4925-03, S4928 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(speaking of "a number of fairly obvious policy considerations" supporting substantially identical
rules, including protecting against "the grave risk to the public if a rapist or child molester remains at
large"); 140 Cong. Rec. H8968-01, H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (comments of Rep. Molinari)
(stating that "the revised conference bill contains a critical reform that I have long sought to protect
the public from crimes of sexual violence").
90. See 137 Cong. Rec. S4925-03, 54925 (daily ed. April 24, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Dole)
(asserting that an earlier crime bill containing a substantially identical version of the new rules was
designed to offer protection against "those criminals who prey on women"); David J. Karp, Evidence
of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, Address Before the Evidence
Section of the Association of American Law Schools 20 (Jan. 9, 1993) (on file with the Washington
Law Review) (describing sex-offense cases as involving "one of the most atrocious forms of criminal
violence"). This address has been referred to by Senator Dole and Representative Molinari as an
authoritative part of the new rules' legislative history. See, e.g., 140 Cong. Rec. S12990-01, S12990
(daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
91. See, eg., Prior Crimes Evidence Rule for Sexual Violence Cases § 1, at 3 (1994) [hereinafter
Background Materials] (contained in packet of materials provided by Representative Molinari's
office for use in effort to gain support for the amendment containing the new rules) (on file with the
Washington Law Review) ("The need to protect the public from crimes of sexual violence makes the
adoption of [the new rules of evidence] by Congress imperative as a matter of institutional
responsibility.').
Washington Law Review Vol. 70:883, 1995
as difficult to prosecute.9' They have designed the new rules to remedy
the structural difficulties that currently hinder prosecutions.93
Of even greater importance is the sponsors' second category of
arguments that focus on the nature of sexual offenders. This "small class
of depraved criminals," so the argument goes, is motivated by an
uncontrollable, omnipresent compulsion not present in ordinary people.9
A defendant's prior sexual offenses work more like habit evidence rather
than character evidence under this view.96 Sexual-offense evidence,
therefore, becomes especially probative of guilt.97 Such evidence is
imperative in showing which category of humanity a defendant falls into:
the ordinary or the depraved. A charge of sexual assault or child
molestation against a member of the depraved caste carries a special
plausibility."
92. See 140 Cong. Rec. H8968-01, H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994). For instance, one
sponsor made the following statement:
Moreover, [child-sexual-abuse] cases require reliance on child victims whose credibility can
readily be attacked in the absence of substantial corroboration.... Similarly, adult-victim sexual
assault cases are distinctive, and often turn on difficult credibility determinations ...
Knowledge that the defendant has committed rapes on other occasions is frequently critical in
assessing the relative plausibility of these claims and accurately deciding cases that would
otherwise become unresolvable swearing matches.
Id. (statement of Rep. Molinari). In addition, the problem of convincing victims of sexual offenses to
testify at trial, or even to report their attack to the authorities, may be a burden on prosecution not
present in other categories of crime. See Background Materials, supra note 91, § (5), at 1.
93. See letter from the chief congressional sponsors (Sen. Orrin Hatch, Rep. Susan Molinari, Rep.
Jon Kyl), to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and submitted to the Secretary of the Judicial
Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 (Oct. 11, 1994) [hereinafter
congressional sponsors' letter] (on file with the Washington Law Review) (stating that the new rules
"will greatly facilitate the effective prosecution of violent sex offenders and c.hild molesters").
94. 137 Cong. Rec. S3191-02, S3241, supra note 83.
95. See id. (explaining that evidence of prior sexual assaults shows the defendant to be possessed
of a combination of personality traits that renders him or her incapable of rrsisting sexual impulse).
Implying that this compulsion is not satisfied by the single capitulation to it, but rather requires
periodic indulgence, the chief congressional sponsors observe that "rapists and child molesters
frequently commit numerous crimes before being apprehended and prosecuted." Congressional
sponsors' letter, supra note 93, at 14.
96. Compare Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited, supra note 20, at 146 n.102 (explaining that
proponents of the logical relevance of uncharged-misconduct evidence base their reasoning on the
postulation that "the more times a perpetrator repeats [an] act, the more likely it is that he repeated it
on the date in question, if the conditions for its perpetration are much the same as before") with
McCormick on Evidence, supra note 18, § 195, at 575 (explaining habit evidence as that which
shows "one's regular response to a repeated situation").
97. See Karp, supra note 90, at 5 (employing the doctrine of chances an1 stating that "[it would
be quite a coincidence if a person who just happened to be a chronic rapist was falsely or mistakenly
implicated in a later crime of the same type").
98. See congressional sponsors' letter, supra note 93, at 6-7 (stating that "[a] charge of rape or
child molestation has greater plausibility against a person" implicated in oth-.r sexual offenses).
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Finally, the sponsors often appeal to a third set of arguments about the
rules' potential to curb anomalous adjudications. Their concerns here
rely on anecdotal testimony about the clearly guilty defendant who "got
off" because either: (1) crucial corroborating character evidence was
excluded at trial and the direct and circumstantial evidence that existed
was not of a quality to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt, or (2) the crucial character evidence was admitted, but
the appellate court overturned the conviction under a more stringent
interpretation of the jurisdiction's character-evidence rules.9 9 Proponents
of the new rules assert that the current rules are ambiguous,"ro and that
judges are left either too free"' or too constricted 02 to render consistent
decisions regarding such evidence.10 3 They lay responsibility for this
unacceptable state of affairs at the doorstep of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which went into effect in 1975 and were thereafter mimicked
by the states." The proponents of the new rules have thus appealed to
Congress to remedy these problems by modifying and making clear the
law with regard to the admission of prior-sexual-offense evidence.
99. Numerous appellate cases are cited to prove the second assertion. The two cases cited most
frequently are People v. Sanza, 509 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1986) (reversing defendant's conviction for rape
and murder because of admission of evidence concerning three other rapes for which he had been
convicted), and People v. Key, 203 Cal. Rptr. 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (excluding evidence of
defendant's prior convictions for sexual assaults against three other women in prosecution of
defendant for rape, and reversing conviction because of admission of testimony by another woman,
offered to rebut defendant's claim of victim consent, that defendant had sexually assaulted her).
100. See 137 Cong. Rec. S3191-02, S3239, supra note 83 (stating that "[n]ot all courts have
recognized the area of sex offense prosecutions as one requiring special standards or treatment");
137 Cong. Rec. at S3239-40 (detailing conflicting decisions with similar facts).
101. The freedom here is that of being able to ignore the sponsors' pleas that prior-sexual-offense
evidence is highly probative, not normally overly prejudicial, and should not be required to satisfy a
current category of exception to be admitted. See, e.g., 137 Cong. Rec. at S3240 (expressing concern
over the fact that under current versions of rule 404(b), admission of prior-sexual-offense evidence
"may depend on unpredictable decisions by individual trial judges").
102. Id. (stating that since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, states following the
federal model have rendered their courts "no longer free to recognize straightforwardly the need for
rules of admission tailored to the distinctive characteristics of sex offense cases").
103. See 137 Cong. Rec. S3191-02, S3239, supra note 83 ("The approach of the courts has been
characterized by considerable uncertainty and inconsistency.').
104. See congressional sponsors' letter, supra note 93, at 8 (stating that following the federal
model has caused many states to create "evidence rules that deprive the courts of their former
latitude to overtly adopt special rules of admissibility for similar crimes evidence in sex offense
cases").
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C. The New Rules' Procedural Disposition and an Aliernative
Formulation of the Rules Offered by the Evidence Advisory
Committee to the Judicial Conference
FRE 413-415 did not go into immediate effect upon enactment. The
amendments are subject to a period of review and comment by the
Judicial Conference of the United States."05 The Judicial Conference's
Advisory Committee on Federal Evidence Rules took: the opportunity
afforded by the 150-day review period to solicit critiques and
suggestions for changes from the wider legal community. The
Committee's review resulted in a recommendation that the Judicial
Conference send back to Congress the substance of the new rules
composed in a different form."°6 In addressing the critics' concerns, the
Committee chose to rewrite Rules 413-415 into Rule 404(a) and Rule
405.107
105. 108 Stat. 1796, 2137. The Conference has 150 days after the date of enactment to suggest
changes to FRE 413-415. Congress then has 150 additional days to adopt the Conference's
suggestions. But Congress is under no obligation to do so. It may alter the new rules in any way it
wishes. If it does nothing, the original amendments automatically become law. Id.
106. See Berger, supra note 11.
107. A new Rule 404(a)(4) would provide:
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,
except:
(4) Character in sexual misconduct cases. If otherwise admissible under these rules, in a criminal
case in which the accused is charged with sexual assault or child molestation, or in a civil case
in which a claim is predicated on a party's alleged commission of sexual assault or child
molestation, evidence of another act of sexual assault or child molestation, or evidence to rebut
such proof or inference therefrom.
(A) In weighing the probative value of such evidence, the court, as part of its rule 403
determination, may consider.
(i) proximity in time to the charged or predicate misconduct;
(ii) similarity to the charged or predicate misconduct;
(iii) frequency of the other acts;
(iv) surrounding circumstances;
(v) relevant intervening events; and
(vi) other relevant similarities or differences.
Id. Subsection (4)(B) changes the notice requirement to a "reasonable time in advance of trial."
Additionally, Rule 405 would be amended by adding a new subsection (c), which would allow
character to be proved, in sexual-offense cases, by specific instances of conduct and by reputation
and opinion testimony. Id.
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The Committee's recommendation answers many of the complaints
leveled against the new rules. °8 Certainly, the clarification of the new
rules' relationship to Rule 403 would preclude significant resources
being expended litigating that issue. Nevertheless, the Committee's
version incorporates the substance of the new rules into the existing rules
of evidence, and in doing so, perpetuates the fundamental problems of
prejudice presented by the proposition that character evidence should be
allowed to prove conduct. Thus, no matter which version of the new
rules eventually is adopted, the most disturbing problem remains.
IMl. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IMPERILED: THE
DANGERS OF PREJUDICE IN THE USE OF PRIOR-SEXUAL-
OFFENSE EVIDENCE TO SHOW PROPENSITY
FRE 413-415 are grounded on a view of the source and nature of
sexual offender behavior that does not comport well with psychological
and sociological evidence. The sponsors of the new rules are inviting the
use of highly prejudicial information to resolve extremely discomforting
questions. A jury's answers to these questions will determine a
defendant's freedom, and yet, under the new scheme, a defendant
effectively might be denied one of the strongest protections against an
inaccurate result that the U.S. criminal justice system offers: the
presumption of innocence. The loss of the presumption of innocence
would shake the foundations of our accusatorial system ofjustice.1"
The new rules are grounded on unconvincing arguments of the
probative value of prior-sexual-offense evidence. Proponents describe
prior-sexual-offense evidence as exceptionally illuminating on questions
of later actions."t The sponsors ground these claims on their beliefs
about the psychological and/or biological nature of sexually aggressive
108. In the "Note to Rule 404(a)(4)" following the rewritten rules, the Committee explained-
The changes were made in order to integrate the provisions both substantively and stylistically
with the existing Rules of Evidence; to illuminate the intent expressed by the principal drafters
of the measure; to clarify drafting ambiguities that might necessitate considerable judicial
attention if they remained unresolved; and to eliminate possible constitutional infirmities.
Id.
109. Cf. Reed, Propensity- Part , supra note 8, at 713-14 (stating that an accusatorial system of
justice presumes innocence and requires that the state prove that the defendant broke the law,
whereas an inquisitorial system ofjustice presumes guilt and requires that the defendant prove his or
her innocence); Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited, supra note 20, at 163 (explaining how the use of
uncharged-criminal-conduct evidence in sexual-offense cases is moving the federal courts toward an
inquisitorial criminal trial process).
110. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
Washington Law Review Vol. 70:883, 1995
behavior."' However, in making these empirical judgments, the sponsors
do not distinguish between the motivations underlying the variety of
sexual offenses encompassed by Rules 413-415. For instance, the most
recent research indicates rape is a crime of violence and not of sexual
compulsion."' Thus, evidence of a past charge of fondling a teenaged
daughter may not offer any meaningful help in answering the question of
whether the defendant committed the charged rape. Yet, by the terms of
the new rules, such inflammatory evidence would be admissible for this
purpose.11
3
Moreover, studies indicate that sexual offenders exhibit either a low
rate of recidivism" 4 or, at the very least, no greater a likelihood of
reoffense than other types of criminals." 5 Thus, prior-sexual-offense
evidence is at worst weakly relevant and at best only as relevant as most
other bad-act evidence on questions of conduct on a specific occasion.
Special treatment of sexual-offense evidence, therefore, is unwarranted.
The non-exceptional probative value of prior-sexual-offense evidence,
when used to show propensity for conduct, gives rise to the two dangers
discussed in part I.A. Juries will be more likely to convict a defendant
because of who he or she is rather than what he or she did, and juries
I 11. See supra note 95. The sponsors did not support their claims by including studies on sexual
offender psychology in the legislative debate or record. See infra note 125. Studies nevertheless
demonstrate a differing probability, of reoffense between rape, pedophilia, sexual abuse of
adolescents, and exhibitionism, making it illogical to afford the same propensity effect to all
behaviors as if they were motivated by the same compulsion. See Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited,
supra note 20, at 146-56.
112. Id. at 147-48 (discussing recent studies).
113. Under FRE 413, the admissibility of other sexual-assault evidence is given a "mandatory
cast." See Meltzer, supra note 74, at 1-2. By the terms of the rules, the use of the evidence is subject
only to a test of relevancy. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying t.sxt. Presumably, then,
evidence with even the slightest relevance may be used to show propernity. A past charge of
fondling makes it just slightly more likely tht the defendant committed the charged violent rape, if
for no other reason than that the evidence shows that the defendant is willing to flout social
proprieties. The evidence would, therefore, pass a naked test for relevancy but would not carry with
it the probative value claimed for it by the proponents of the new rules.
114. See, e.g., Allen J. Beck, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Recidivism of
Prisoners Released in 1983 6 (1989), reported in David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other
Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 529, 572 and n.182 (finding among
rapists only a 7.7% rate of rearrest for rape). But see Bryden & Park, supra, at 572-73 & nn.183-85
(reporting higher recidivism rates among sex offenders in studies adopting alternative
methodologies).
115. See Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited, supra note 20, at 155 (citing studies showing the national
recidivism rate for rearrest within three years is 65% for criminals in general, 50% for violent
criminals, 30% for pedophiles and adolescent child abusers, and 25% for rapists rearrested for
another sexual offense). But see A. Nicholas Groth et. al., Undetected Recidivism Among Rapists and
Child Molesters, 28 Crime & Delinq. 450, 453, 456-58, cited in Reed, Rsading Gaol Revisited,
supra note 20, at 149-50, n.117 (indicating that sexual offenses are under-reported and suggesting
that sexual offenders may reoffend at a rate comparable to other types of criminals).
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may overemphasize the evidence, paying less attention to gaps or
inconsistencies in the non-character evidence." 6 The probability that a
court will face the specter of presiding over the conviction of an innocent
defendant increases under FRE 413-415.
The sponsors of the rules counter arguments about prejudice by
implying that there is little danger of unfairly prejudicing a defendant
because the evidence accurately predicts what the defendant did on the
occasion in question.'17 But, as the studies just cited indicate, conflicting
research casts serious doubt on the reliability of these claims."' Equally
important, our society's view of sexual offenses renders this type of
evidence particularly inflammatory."9 Sex offenders have been the
objects of numerous "crusades" by the public. 2 The widespread
contempt with which suspected sexual offenders are held provides a
strong basis for the fear that juries will punish the defendant regardless of
other evidence pointing to guilt or innocence.
Psychological evidence about how people react to certain kinds of
information supports this fear. Researchers describe a "halo effect"
wherein people tend to form generalized judgments about another person
on the basis of one exceptionally good or bad quality.' This tendency,
coupled with the predilection to focus more closely on negative
information than on positive information, gives a single, negative bit of
information inordinate weight in the mind of the person forming a
judgment." Additionally, people will make predictions based on single
or small numbers of past events, which, according to statistical theory, is
an unreliable methodology." The Kalven study showing that prior-
116. See Bryden & Park, supra note 114, at 565. State v. Dawkins, 71 Wash. App. 902, 863 P.2d
124 (1993), offers a good example of the influence character evidence has on ajury. In Dawkins, the
defendant was accused of fondling two 13-year-old girls as they slept next to one another on his
living room floor. Both girls claimed to have been touched on the same date, at the same time, and in
the same location. The jury acquitted Dawkins of the charge involving one of the girls but convicted
on the charge involving the second girl. The only difference in the evidence presented was testiinony
by the second girl that the defendant had fondled her on prior occasions.
117. See supra notes 96-98.
118. See Bryden & Park, supra note 114, at 561-64 & nn.146-56 (describing the range of often
conflicting conclusions about the source of behavior drawn from psychological studies of human
behavior).
119. See Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited, supra note 20, at 162 & n.189.
120. See id. at 162-63 (describing past and present crusades in the United States against sex
offenders).
121. See Mendez, supra note 22, at 1047 & nn.234-36.
122. Id. at 1045-46 & nn.226-28.
123. Id. at 1048 & nn.238-48.
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misconduct evidence in general is extremely persuasive suggests that
what is true of individuals in this regard is also true ofjturies. 24
The use of such influential evidence effectively jettisons the
presumption of innocence accorded defendants."z Evidence of character
is so persuasive that its use often will place the defendant in the position
of having to prove his or her innocence. 26 Such change is a departure
from the tradition of accusatorial justice in the United States. 127 If
Congress really intended to move the federal courts into the realm of
inquisitorial adjudication, it should at least have explicitly debated and
voted on such a proposal. To move in that direction after a brief floor
debate marked by insupportable notions of the probative value of sexual-
offense evidence 28 is a poor way to invite so profound a change.'29
IV. THREE OPTIONS FOR WASHINGTON TO CONSIDER IN THE
FACE OF FRE 413-415
Washington should consider three options as it decides whether to
follow FRE 413-415. The state could decide that it is satisfied with the
current regime governing uncharged-sexual-offense evidence and retain
the status quo. Alternatively, it could expand the lustful-disposition
exception to include evidence of crimes committed against a class of
victims. Finally, it could adopt a modified version of FRE 413-415,
requiring a finding that a defendant suffers from a compulsion to commit
sexual crimes before prior sexual offenses may be used to show
propensity.
Washington readily admits prior-sexual-offense evidence when it
plausibly falls within one of the enumerated exceptions in ER 404(b). 130
124. See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
125. Cf. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited, supra note 20, at 163 (idenifying in trials of sex
offenders a movement toward an inquisitorial system of justice marked by a relaxation of the bar to
proof of the defendant's bad moral character by specific, uncharged acts).
126. Cf. id. Professor Reed does not lament this result in sexual-offense .ases, arguing both that
nothing in the Bill of Rights mandates a presumption of innocence and that society's interest in
being free from sexual assaults outweighs the benefits derived from the procedural protections the
presumption offers. Id.
127. See id. at 160.
128. See 140 Cong. Rec. H8968-01, H8990 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes)
(explaining that the rule changes had 20 minutes of debate on the Senate floor).
129. Professor Reed argues that the United States already has moved significantly toward an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice, so perhaps the change is not so profound. See Reed, Reading
Gaol Revisited, supra note 20, at 160-63. Nevertheless, the full ramifications of this type of change
should have been acknowledged during the congressional debates.
130. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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In addition, such evidence may be used to prove that the defendant
suffers from a lustful inclination toward a specific individual."' Thus,
uncharged-sexual-offense evidence is available to prosecutors under a
variety of situations. At the same time, this scheme protects defendants
against the naked use of such evidence to prove propensity. Though still
vulnerable to the dangers of jury prejudice if the evidence is offered
under one of the recognized exceptions, the defendant is at least
protected when the relevance of the uncharged-misconduct evidence is at
its lowest. This option would protect from further erosion the
presumption of innocence granted to defendants in an accusatorial
system of justice.
Expanding the lustful-disposition exception to include evidence of
sexual offenses committed against a class of victims, on the other hand,
would offer prosecutors a stronger weapon with which to fight sexual
assault and child molestation. Studies support the view that some sex
offenders suffer from a compulsion to assault a certain kind of victim. 3 '
Evidence of past assaults are probative of the act in question, therefore,
when the victim of the charged crime is in the same class as the victim of
the uncharged assault. The class, however, should be defined in a way
that does not diminish the relevance of the uncharged-misconduct
evidence. Thus, the pre-teenage female children of the defendant might
form a class, but college-aged men probably would not. Classes could be
specified by legislation, expert testimony, or judicial discretion. Because
it would exclude highly prejudicial character evidence of tenuous
relevance, this scheme is a far better option than adoption of rules like
FRE 413-415.
If the state legislature or the state supreme court nevertheless chooses
to adopt rules similar to FRE 413-415, it should consider mechanisms to
limit the risk of convicting innocent defendants. One promising option
would require an expert to testify that a defendant suffers from a sexually
aggressive compulsion before prior-sexual-offense evidence could be
used to prove conduct in conformity with character.13 1
131. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text
132. See Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited, supra note 20, at 150-52 & nn.124-33, 138 (describing
several known compulsions marked by a lust for a member of a class of victims, including
heterosexual pedophilia, homosexual pedophilia, and hebrephilia (lust for teenagers, usually female
and often family members)).
133. Washington would not be the first state to precondition admission of prior-sexual-offense
evidence on this type of finding. See State v. Treadaway, 568 P.2d 1061 (Ariz. 1977) (holding
uncharged-sexual-offense evidence inadmissible without expert testimony stating that the evidence
showed an emotional propensity to commit the charged offense). But see, State v. Smith, 753 P.2d
Washington Law Review
Washington already has a mechanism in place for making such
determinations. The Sexually Violent Predators Act 134 mandates that a
psychological and medical assessment of a defendant's personality be
made before committing sexually violent predators to a special facility.'35
Due to the criteria used in making the determination, the past, similar
sexual misconduct of a defendant who is deemed a sexually violent
predator becomes much more reliable as circumstantial evidence of
culpability in the charged crime.
The state legislature defined a sexually violent predator as any person
who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which
predisposes the person to commit acts of sexual violence.'36 It defined a
mental abnormality as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity" of the person.' Though these
definitions are specific to violent sexual offenders, the state could
establish criteria appropriate to other sexual-offense behavior. The most
important aspect of the definition, in any case, is the requirement of a
finding that the source of the prohibited behavior is likely to lead to
repeated conduct.
Under the Sexually Violent Predators Act, the evaluation of the
defendant is performed by a person "professionally qualified" to conduct
such an exam.' Included within the scope of the assessment data are the
defendant's criminal history, psychological and physiological testing
results, substance abuse history, interviews with significant others, the
defendant's sexual history, information on prior attempts to remediate
and control behavior, including past treatment, and information on
triggers of offending behavior.' The statute assumes,, then, that after
such an assessment is performed a reasonably accurate statement about
the defendant's sexual compulsions can be made.
A similar scheme could be implemented in the context of a criminal
trial where the prosecution seeks to introduce evidence of prior sexual
misconduct for the purpose of proving propensity. The finding of
compulsion would operate as a threshold test for admissibility under this
1174 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (admitting uncharged propensity evidence in a child molestation case
without, apparently, the required expert testimony).
134. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09 (1992).
135. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 71.09.040, .060(1) (1992).
136. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.020(1) (1992).
137. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.020(2) (1992).
138. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.040 (1992). The Washington Department of Health promulgated
the standards for the psychological assessment. See Wash. Admin. Code § 246-930-320 (1992).
139. Wash. Admin. Code § 246-930-320.
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mechanism. The most important benefit would come from the increased
reliability of the prior-sexual-offense evidence. If a court found that a
defendant suffers from a biologically or psychologically-sourced
compulsion, evidence of his or her past sexual misconduct would suggest
that the defendant does not possess the ability to control his or her
behavior. Thus, the finding of compulsion would catapult the prior-
misconduct evidence much closer to the realm of habit evidence. 4 '
Authorities assert that the probative value of habit evidence
presumptively outweighs its prejudicial effect,' 4 ' and requiring sexual
misconduct evidence to meet this level of reliability before courts allow
it to prove propensity would go a long way toward overcoming problems
of prejudice and relevance.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress, in its enthusiasm to control crime, has changed the Federal
Rules of Evidence in a manner that is overbroad and incapable of fairly
taking into account the complexities of antisocial sexual behavior. The
new rules are too broad and clumsy to fairly regulate the use of such a
powerful class of evidence. Under the present manifestation of the
lustful-disposition exception, Washington has developed a reasonable
system to govern the use of uncharged-sexual-offense evidence. If
decisiomakers within the state nevertheless decide that prosecutors are
not able to effectively win convictions against sexual offenders and child
molesters, broadening the lustful-disposition exception is one rational
way to re-balance the advantages at trial. At the very least, the
decisionmakers should temper the undeniable potency that the new rules
will bring to the prosecution's arsenal of weapons against defendants in
sexual-offense cases with the protection that a required finding of
psychological or biological compulsion would afford.
140. See supra note 96.
141. See McCormick on Evidence, supra note 18, § 195. The critics' argument that prior sexual
misconduct is so inflammatory that it will render a jury incapable of focusing on the other evidence
remains valid and strong. Subscribers to this view are not likely to accept the use of prior-sexual-
offense evidence in order to prove propensity under any circumstance. The argument in part IV is
that if such evidence must be used, it should at least be used with the minimal protections a finding
of compulsion would provide.

